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by The SINCGAR (Single Channel Ground Airborne Radio) has been the mainstay communication platform for American combat forces since the mid-80s. Featuring NSA approved Type-1 encryption and frequency hopping, the radio is regarded for being nearly impervious to jamming and resistant to eavesdroppers. However, recent reports indicate that specialized Hezbollah teams were in fact listening in on Israeli communications using technology provided by Iran for tapping into the SINCGAR based communications between Israeli forces.
Is the opportunity for joint operations worth offering our allies access to America's military hardware? Could the primary means of communication really be cracked?
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I don't buy it (radio compromise). by VnutZ :: NR8 :: on 20 September 2006
Is the opportunity for joint operations worth offering our allies access to America's military hardware?
For this, I say NO. We seem to play in our own sandbox so much and are so relunctant to share anyway - we may as well keep our best stuff to ourselves.
Could the primary means of communication really be cracked?
I want to say NO on this one. While I am not impressed with the SINCGAR, I still believe the report is overstating the communications break. Despite the improvements to the radio, it still frequency hops ridiculously slow. And the late net entry "feature" to me implies that many of those hops are repetitive for synchronization. I think jamming the thing was difficult in the 80s, but probably a trivial task today using adaptations of such equipment as the WinRadio. Now, the encryption is likely to still be intact - after all, the NSA is pretty good at what it does. Besides, if the Iranians were supplying SINCGAR listening equipment ... one would think such equipment would have been provided to the more prominent insurgent groups in Iraq. The guys we were capturing were largely using maritime radios and GMRS/FRS radios for their communications - nothing even remotely advanced for eavesdropping. I think the compromise was more likely a function of the Israelis not using the secure modes in which case any radio scanner can listen to the SINCGAR.
RE: I don't buy it (radio compromise). by Dereck :: NR5 :: on 21 September 2006
so is cellular/GPRS/BGAN prominent? For mobile intra-domain data and even voice this technology is becoming standard in a lot of sectors.
RE: I don't buy it (radio compromise). by VnutZ :: NR8 :: on 21 September 2006
You mean amongst insurgents or the legitimate military forces?
RE: I don't buy it (radio compromise). by Dereck :: NR5 :: on 21 September 2006
I originally meant among legit military. But it would be interesting to know if insurgents use the technology as well. While its not even the technology, it’s the service I would think they would have a hard time obtaining.
RE: I don't buy it (radio compromise). by VnutZ :: NR8 :: on 21 September 2006
so is cellular/GPRS/BGAN prominent? For mobile intra-domain data and even voice this technology is becoming standard in a lot of sectors.
Cellular - We don't use it for operations, but they were certainly in use for getting in touch with local contacts. The insurgency was using mobile phones quite a bit until the more savvy realized they were traceable and exploitable. It's still the cheapest option for them ... so while the higher level players may use a more technical solution, the bit players utilize their mobile phones for operations.
GPRS & BGAN - We don't use anything like this, at least not mainstream. Pretty much anything used in operational communications must meet the NSAs crypto requirements [Type-1 capable]. While these technologies offer better bandwidth and quality than what we've got ... without an encryption module they're not of much use for military operations. I did find an interesting radio system in use by the British that basically did local VoIP on a short range, 802.11b network. It was quite a brilliant little idea and being based on protocols interpreted by computers lends itself to either 1) being easily broken or 2) remaining cutting edge with upgrades and rotating crypto.
RE: I don't buy it (radio compromise). by Dereck :: NR5 :: on 21 September 2006
Interesting....I was under the impression that BGAN was used my Military orgs (maybe its just PMC's). BGAN as a service can meet NSA crypto standards, "Michael Butler, Chief Operating Officer of Inmarsat, said: “Inmarsat has a long history of providing the US Government with mobile satellite communications that, when combined with NSA-certified Type 1 encryption devices, can be secured to the highest level. With our BGAN service launch, planned for later in 2005, we will offer these customers unparalleled mobile broadband IP service, and it is essential that this capability can be similarly assured for government users."
I know in oil and gas applications BGAN is used for Out-of-Band type management of control and automation systems. There are some real benefits to mobile IP devices like BGAN modems. If you have a lender that provides Type 1 IP encryption you can be mobile as you want with data and voice (especially if your using a soft phone). I would guess your British friends were using something similar to BGAN shared via 802.11b router and VoIP phones.
RE: I don't buy it (radio compromise). by VnutZ :: NR8 :: on 25 September 2006
Ahhh ... I didn't recognize BGAN as anything familiar - even after following a link to read on it. INMARSAT is used by the military, but not as a mainstream tool of communication. Satellite based communications are somewhat restricted due to bandwidth, availability and cost.