Virtue Ethics Part I: Virtue among alternatives

There are, of course, as many theories for rationalizing human behavior as there are humans. In the west, in the last two-hundred and fifty years, there have been two influentially dominant modes of approaching moral behavior: the deontological (Wikipedia) approach favored by Immanuel Kant and the utilitarian approach (Wikipedia) invented by Jeremy Bentham and honed by John Stuart Mill and later the American pragmatists William James and the late Richard Rorty. The former emphasizes the morality of duty and focuses on individual motive, but often in idealized conditions. The latter determines the goodness (utility) of an act by its consequences, that is, its contribution to the quotient of happiness (the total happiness possible in a society) – if an act increases the total happiness it is good, if not, bad. Thus a sort of contest between the deontological approach (obligations, moral universals, and following rules) versus the utilitarian approach (responsibility solely for the consequences of our own actions) ensued.

A third way of thinking about the morality of behavior is known as virtue ethics (Wikipedia). It originated with Aristotle and has ebbed and flowed along with his reputation, but its greatest expounder was St. Thomas Aquinas. Virtue ethics has experienced something of a resurgence in the last fifty years. Rather than emphasizing duty or consequences, this approach emphasizes habits. Developing character is a function of good habits developed within particular circumstances.

Aristotle taught in his Nicomachean Ethics that each virtue should be seen as existing on a continuum. Achieving virtue means finding the place along that continuum that fits the occasion. Consider, for example, courage. Courage exists on a continuum between cowardice and foolhardiness or recklessness. A general may see that the odds are stacked against him, and thus his decision to walk away from a fight might be a courageous one (see, for example, the career of General George Washington). On another occasion, that same general may decide to lead a charge in which he and all his men are massacred, but still they acted courageously. In different times and circumstances, the virtue of courage may be closer to recklessness than cowardice and other times it may all be reversed. Wherever virtue happens to fall on the continuum, given all the elements of the circumstances, Aristotle names the golden mean. The golden mean, in other words, moves along the continuum at different times and different places and hitting that mean is the achievement of virtue in that circumstance.

This is not to say that the virtues are relative so much as contextual. Consider the elaboration of the virtue of gratitude by another great virtue ethicist, Adam Smith, from Part III of his brilliant work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments:

The general rules of almost all the virtues, the general rules which determine what are the offices of prudence, of charity, of generosity, of gratitude, of friendship, are in many respects loose and inaccurate, admit of many exceptions, and require so many modifications, that it is scarce possible to regulate our conduct entirely by a regard to them. The common proverbial maxims of prudence, being founded in universal experience, are perhaps the best general rules which can be given about it. To affect, however, a very strict and literal adherence to them would evidently be the most absurd and ridiculous pedantry. Of all the virtues I have just now mentioned, gratitude is that, perhaps, of which the rules are the most precise, and admit of the fewest exceptions. That as soon as we can we should make a return of equal, and if possible of superior value to the services we have received, would seem to be a pretty plain rule, and one which admitted of scarce any exceptions. Upon the most superficial examination, however, this rule will appear to be in the highest degree loose and inaccurate, and to admit of ten thousand exceptions. If your benefactor attended you in your sickness, ought you to attend him in his? or can you fulfil the obligation of gratitude, by making a return of a different kind? If you ought to attend him, how long ought you to attend him? The same time which he attended you, or longer, and how much longer? If your friend lent you money in your distress, ought you to lend him money in his? How much ought you to lend him? When ought you to lend him? Now, or to-morrow, or next month? And for how long a time? It is evident, that no general rule can be laid down, by which a precise answer can, in all cases, be given to any of these questions. The difference between his character and yours, between his circumstances and yours, may be such, that you may be perfectly grateful, and justly refuse to lend him a halfpenny: and, on the contrary, you may be willing to lend, or even to give him ten times the sum which he lent you, and yet justly be accused of the blackest ingratitude, and of not having fulfilled the hundredth part of the obligation you lie under. As the duties of gratitude, however, are perhaps the most sacred of all those which the beneficent virtues prescribe to us, so the general rules which determine them are, as I said before, the most accurate. Those which ascertain the actions required by friendship, humanity, hospitality, generosity, are still more vague and indeterminate.

Smith’s argument is that general rules for ethical behavior are usually not that useful. We cannot regulate our conduct by general rules. Instead, he suggests that achieving virtue depends on making good decisions in conditions of uncertainty.

A requirement for this kind of thinking is a belief in free will and a capacity for a high degree of self-reflection about one’s actions and how they are or may be perceived by others. The aim of acting virtuously is human flourishing, which will be variously defined depending on the circumstances that an individual perceives. Passing judgment on another’s virtue is often difficult because we do not see the circumstances as they see them. Hence, Smith and other virtue ethicists often advocate human liberty. And yet it should be acknowledged that the virtues can be described, in their description is a key to their achievement, and in understanding how to achieve virtue our capacity for judgment increases. If we are actors making choices we need to know what it is we are choosing about.

There is a long history of describing the virtues, and Part II of this post will describe the four cardinal virtues while Part III will describe the three theological virtues.

(This article was cross-posted at the author’s blog, www.avenhampark.blogspot.com).