Tyche

One of the most fascinating aspects of Thucydides, as a historian, is his use of Chance (Tyche) in his narrative. His assessment of risk is far different from the oft-held belief that chance is synonymous with opportunity. In Thucydides we find a much more pessimistic outlook. Chance is the great detractor. It is important to note that Thucydides does not interpret chance in the most objective of senses, but rather uses it as a rhetorical device. This is most salient in his treatment of the campaigns in Pylos and Sphacteria. Here Thucydides allows his dislike of both Demosthenes and Cleon, especially Cleon, to bleed over into his account of the operation. Thucydides, at times, injects chance into circumstances when it serves the ulterior purpose of detracting from Cleon. Thucydides makes a concerted effort to pick and choose where he includes important details in order to bolster the role of chance and thereby impeach the success of the campaign as not truly representing real strategic or tactical skill. It is clear that Thucydides intends for us to believe that Sphacteria was a case of lightning striking twice, the benefits of which befell Cleon.

As is natural when evaluating chance, the historian must look first to the realm where chance rules as king – war. The usual complaint associated with explanations involving chance in war is that it represents no explanation at all. Chance, set forth as a modus operandi in war, is often dismissed as a convenient way to escape real investigation. Although this complaint does not give chance in war its true measure of influence in most cases, in this discussion of an operation we find common ground with those protestors. Chance is given for a lack of an explanation or, more precisely, in place of the real explanation. What we cannot attribute to individuals, we must then tally in favor of dumb luck.

The first step in the analysis is not so much a discussion of chance as it is an overall indictment of Thucydides’ historical skills in this instance. The trouble begins with the incomplete description of events leading up to the engagement at Pylos and Sphacteria. We are told that the forty ships bound for Sicily have been instructed to stop and help in Corcyra, but no mention is made of any landing on the Messenia coast.¹Thucydides, by his description, implies that Demosthenes has some grounds to command this landing and he also states that the Athenians were supposed to land at Pylos and “do what was wanted there, before continuing their voyage.”²

Thucydides is obviously leaving something out here. We are forced to wonder what exactly was the Athenian fleet supposed to do at Pylos and why did Thucydides leave out any discussion that this topic must have received back in Athens? The insignificance of this landing, as claimed by the fleet commanders is subsequently undermined by the immense response the Spartans give to the incursion. Our next point of contention comes when the “soldiers themselves wanting occupation were seized with a sudden impulse to go round and fortify the place.”³ Although not definitely erroneous, the reader must wonder how the soldiers themselves became so “seized” as to endeavor to build fairly elaborate fortifications, which, as it turned out, became so important to the future course of the campaign. The fortification of the peninsula turns out to be an important tactical development, which plays itself out in significant strategic ways, and we are left to believe that it is carried out at the behest of the common soldiers acting out of boredom.

The next task is to establish Thucydides’ distaste for Cleon. This is not a challenging undertaking nor is it necessary to go beyond the bounds of this specific narrative to find sufficient evidence of this animosity. Cleon, in this episode, comes across as a grubbing, lowborn politician. After the Spartan envoys propose a relatively generous peace, Cleon stood up and “grasped at something further.”⁴ Thucydides characterizes his refusal of the terms as capricious and ill advised. The attacks upon Cleon are resumed in earnest with the creation of the argument between him and Nicias, in which they debate the correct course of action. Thucydides portrays Cleon as a fool who brazenly pushes himself into command of the Pylos expedition and then cowardly attempts to back out of it.⁵ Thucydides tells us that the others present “could not help laughing at his empty words.”⁶ The final indictment of Cleon as a statesman comes from the assertion that either way the Athenians would gain a good end in his victory or his death.⁷ Thucydides makes it clear, through his narrative, that Cleon is not held in high regard, however this may be more of Thucydides’ attitude reflected in his prose than actual substance.

In legal terms we have now established a motive for Thucydides poor showing in this instance. These events provide the background for Thucydides’ rhetorical deviousness during this explanation. Drawing back to the beginning of the episode, Demosthenes is only capable of pursuing his planned invasion because of a storm that was obviously unpredictable.⁸ This attributes the entire series of events that follow to chance, although there is good reason to believe that this landing was intended long before any “squall” broke the calm of the seas.

The truly powerful nature of this occupation is shown slightly later. Sparta calls off the annual invasion of Attica⁹ and sends for sixty Peloponnesian ships from Corcyra.¹⁰ This represents a radical policy shift for Sparta. Not only is Sparta, a traditional land power, preparing to engage in a sea borne operation, but also the standard destruction of Attica, pursuant with Archidamnus’ strategy, is canceled in order to rectify this situation. At this point the reader is expected to believe that this whole endeavor, so paralytic to the Peloponnesus, is nothing more than happenstance in favor of the Athenians. This is neither the first nor the last time that Thucydides seeks to mitigate the success of the operation.

Before the Spartan assault on the encampment in Pylos, Demosthenes gave an assessment of his situation to his men and made a small effort to provide some inspiration. This speech reinforces Thucydides’ mitigating view of chance in war. Demosthenes points out that unlike equally matched opponents on land, the Spartans will have to deal with the greater risk associated with the sea.¹¹ Demosthenes’ hope for success in the battle rests not with the capability of his forces or the effectiveness of his command, but on the dangers and obstacles faced by the attacking Spartan force.

Thucydides is purposefully downplaying the tactical insight of Demosthenes by importing chance in a way not commensurate with the situation. Pylos does present significant problems for an amphibious force; we must expect, however, that Demosthenes chose this ground for just such a reason. The success of the defense does not solely rely on abstract chance, but upon the natural extension of specific choices made by a leader in which risk is calculated and weighed in order to compensate for material disadvantages. Chance does play into the explanation for the successful defense of Pylos, but not in such as a way as to discredit the opportunities perceived by Demosthenes.

The whole conflict is related in terms of paradox, adding a sense of oddity to this victory for the Athenians. Thucydides conjectures that the battle “was a strange reversal of the order of things for Athenians to be fighting from the land and from Laconian land too, against Spartans coming from the sea.”¹² This engagement was an abnormality, an anomaly in the cosmic order of things, not to be attributed to men but to be recognized as a divergent event caused by the whims of fate.

As if the point was not clear enough, Thucydides devalues the Pylos expedition thus far by veiling his personality under the guise of Spartan envoys. They chastise the overweening pride of the Athenians and remind them that they must not “suppose that fortune will always be with you.”¹³ The Spartans go on to say that “sensible men are prudent enough to treat their gains as precarious.”¹⁴ Thucydides appeals to the notion that sensible men, whether Spartan or Athenian, must recognize that the risk involved in war precludes any real ability to secure success. We see this appeal to reasonable men again in the degradation of Cleon. Also highlighted in this exchange is Thucydides’ pessimistic outlook toward chance in war. The Athenians would do themselves well to seek peace now in order avoid “the possible disasters which may follow.”¹⁵ Success in war, a concept that Thucydides finds hard to swallow, is not a positive result of effective leadership accepting risk; it is the consequence of ill-fortune befalling the opponent.

The Spartan envoy rejected, Cleon then pressed the Athenians to take more aggressive action in Sphacteria in order to crush the Spartan garrison on the island. Cleon, once again, throws off the moderate plan to send commissioners to investigate the situation in favor of a “fresh expedition” to take the island by storm.¹⁶ Thucydides lays out a situation in which the brash Cleon is drawn into assuming command of the expedition through the careful rhetorical skill of Nicias. The impression is given that Cleon stumbles into a situation that he does not want and only continues to avoid the charges of hypocrisy that would have naturally resulted from a withdrawal.¹⁷

Cleon’s acceptance of command, according to Thucydides, is anything but by design. The assumption that Cleon lacked premeditation as he approached this endeavor raises the idea that his ultimate success comes from little more than mere chance. How can Cleon be credited for real success when he did not intend to do what he did? The conclusion is obvious enough only if we accept at face value Thucydides’ reconstruction of the events leading up to Cleon’s appointment. As is commonly suspected by historians, Cleon may very well have pulled off an extremely adept political maneuver, knowing well what Nicias’ reaction to his taunts would be. This would further explain his denial of a hoplite force and the assertion that the operation could be completed in twenty days. Chance, as a manipulative tool, does not offer a more plausible explanation in this instance. It serves to debauch the much more reasonable interpretation.

The battle, once joined, on Sphacteria produced a startling example of the ineffectiveness of heavy shock infantry when faced with lighter, more mobile forces that refuse and are able to refuse to engage in close combat. Thucydides is incapable of downplaying the tactical brilliance of the Athenians in the open field battle against the Spartan hoplites.

The avenue for attack is opened again as the Spartans retreat to their central fortress.¹⁸ Owing to the elimination of the hazardous flanks, the Spartans are able to pursue the battle in a much more cost efficient, albeit defensive, manner. At this point “the struggle began to seem endless.”¹⁹ While we can dismiss this as a superfluous statement, we then acquit Thucydides of using slight verbal intonations to bias his reader’s viewpoint. The situation was obviously not endless. A force surrounded by land and also cut off form the sea could not have realistically held out for more than a few weeks, especially under the withering fire of the Athenian peltasts. It is probable that Thucydides wanted his audience to suspect that Demosthenes and Cleon had worked their way into an impasse, only to be saved by an intervention they could not have foreseen. The comment is small enough to be considered inconsequential, but pointed enough to shape opinion. After the battle it is discovered that the Spartans had a good deal of supplies, but Cleon and Demosthenes could not have known that at the time.²⁰

Our dual offenders are saved, in Thucydides’ view, by the timely suggestion given by the Messenian commander to find a way around the Spartans.²¹ Saved from their own failures, Cleon and Demosthenes were able to pin the enemy down from two directions and eventually bring them to heel. This reversal does represent chance in war, as the Athenians could not have known that there would be a pass through the rough terrain or that it was undefended. This was risk, but it was risk turned into opportunity by active commanders. Thucydides seems to hold that chance can only intervene in war in the negative sense and does not make the connection between chance and opportunity or chooses not to do so. The human reaction to fortuitous events is not evident here because it does not serve Thucydides’ manipulative effort.

This certainly does not stop Thucydides from getting in one final snipe. The tactical situation faced by the Spartans induced them to surrender in much the same way as the Persians had overcome the Spartans at Thermopylae. Thucydides makes clear that the connection ends here as he writes that this comparison is as “to compare small things with great.”²² In light of what is said about the impact of the “small” battle later on, one notices Thucydides’ deliberate failure to associate seemingly limited events with great ramifications. Thucydides is wrong to treat the surrender at Sphacteria so cavalierly, especially as compared to his remarks regarding the grave outcome of the battle on prestige of the Spartan fighting man.²³

The success of the Athenians at Pylos and Sphacteria, as related to Thucydides himself, must be seen as important, convincing, and due, for the most part, to the able leadership of Cleon and Demosthenes. Thucydides grudgingly accepts Cleon’s victory. Forced into rhetorical retreat he relates that as “mad as Cleon’s promise was, he fulfilled it.”²⁴ Thucydides, in a last ditch effort, seeks to undermine the skill of the success by highlighting what he views as the idiocy of the undertaking. It is hard to pinpoint exactly what Thucydides finds so absurd about the concept. He seems to associate insurmountable risk with offensive operations and then grows increasingly bitter when that danger does not play out. Perhaps this reflects, to a certain degree, his own failures as a military commander. Despite his best efforts we recognize that the operations at Sphacteria and Pylos had more planning behind them than he would have us believe. In actuality, this campaign was a well-orchestrated use of nimble land forces coupled with the unmatched power of the Athenian navy. Without the danger involved in facing the elite Spartan hoplite, the Athenians were able to force the surrender of the nearly mythic Spartan soldier, thus bringing the Peloponnesus running to the bargaining table. The subsequent turnabouts ignored, the operations in Pylos represent a bold stroke of strategic genius made more so by the innovation and boldness of Cleon who recognized the opportunity of having Spartan soldiers trapped and subject to the greater operational mobility of the Athenian forces.

Thucydides seems to forget that risk is not always harmful. War is the preserve of Tyche, but fortune is not so arbitrary as to be completely unfettered by human resourcefulness. Where chance is most compelling is in those situations in which we can observe human reactions to undreamed of events. Thucydides sees chance only as danger, never opportunity. More neglectful is his use of chance as an alternative to real explanation. The success at Pylos, though undeniably important, was constructed by Thucydides in his history in such a way as to import chance where it suited his personal designs. His treatment of Pylos serves two ends. One is to devalue the skill of Cleon and Demosthenes, and the other is to create a general feeling that war is so riddled with danger as to present a situation little more controllable than a card game.

This may also partially explain Thucydides’ aggrandizement of Pericles. His strategy forsook chance and while minimizing the risk of defeat, it also greatly hindered the Athenians’ ability to win. Upon careful reflection, Thucydides’ audience must rewrite its own conclusions. Through well-articulated literary schemes and subtle intonations Thucydides lowers his estimation of this campaign to simple luck in order to strike at Cleon and Demosthenes. While we do not argue that luck was not present, as it is in every military operation, we do hold that Thucydides ignores the real burden of understanding chance in favor of petty sniping. In the final estimation, though, we must recognize that no historian is truly objective, nor would we want him to be. Human perception and human subjectivity cannot be separated from the telling of human tales or we would be left with only bland, tepid and ultimately uninteresting accounts.

¹ Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War, trans by Richard Crawley, revised by Robert B. Strassler with an introduction by Victor Davis Hanson (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), IV.3. (All references to Thucydides hereafter are to this translation.)

² Thucydides, IV. 3

³ Thucydides, IV. 4

⁴ Thucydides, IV. 21

⁵ Thucydides, IV. 28

⁶ Thucydides, IV. 28

⁷ Thucydides, IV. 28.5

⁸ Thucydides, IV. 3.1

⁹ Thucydides, IV. 6.1

¹⁰ Thucydides, IV. 8.2

¹¹ Thucydides, IV. 10.4

¹² Thucydides, IV. 12.3

¹³ Thucydides, IV. 18.3

¹⁴ Thucydides, IV. 18.3

¹⁵ Thucydides, IV. 18.5

¹⁶ Thucydides, IV. 27.4

¹⁷ Thucydides, IV. 28

¹⁸ Thucydides, IV. 35.2

¹⁹ Thucydides, IV. 36.1

²⁰ Thucydides, IV. 39.2

²¹ Thucydides, IV. 36.1

²² Thucydides, IV. 36.3

²³ Thucydides, IV. 40

²⁴ Thucydides, IV. 39.3